Raphinha's 12 goals in 7 games: When Barcelona couldn't buy a striker, Flick built a No 9 from the right wing
**Core answer (≤60 words):** Raphinha was converted by Hansi Flick from a right winger into Barcelona's functional No 9 for the 2025-26 season, scoring 12 goals in 7 La Liga games and 2 in the Champions League, after the club failed to sign any striker last summer despite losing Lewandowski, Ferran Torres and Rashford. **Key facts:** - Raphinha has 12 goals in 7 La Liga games; only one La Liga player has a better shot-conversion rate. - Lewandowski, Ferran Torres and Rashford departed, combining for 38 league goals the previous season. - Atlético Madrid refused to sell Julián Álvarez; Nico Williams bids failed twice. - Raphinha extended his contract to 2030, when he will be 33 years old. - Barcelona opened with eight straight wins, scoring 5, 2, 5, 5, 5, 4, 7, 3. **Source attribution:** Interview-based feature on Raphinha (publication date not specified in source material) | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** - Q: Why is Raphinha playing as a No 9? A: Barcelona failed to sign any striker after Lewandowski, Ferran Torres and Rashford left, so Flick converted Raphinha internally. - Q: How many goals has Raphinha scored this season? A: 12 in 7 La Liga games and 2 in the Champions League. - Q: How long is Raphinha's contract? A: It runs to 2030, when he will be 33.
I was sitting in my studio in Busan at 5 a.m., rewinding the tape of Elche vs Barcelona on La Liga's opening matchday, and I almost skipped past it. On opening night, all of Spain cared about one question only: was Raphinha still wearing the Blaugrana shirt, after he himself admitted that in his head, he had already left the club. Nobody asked where he would play. Then the starting line-up appeared before my eyes in a strange scene: Lewandowski gone, Ferran Torres gone, Rashford gone — the three of them combined for 38 league goals the previous season, and now not one remained. At the tip of the attack, in the middle of the box, was a familiar right winger. Raphinha turned his back to goal, received the ball, and scored.

That was the opening image of one of the strangest personal reversals I have witnessed in thirteen years of following European football. A player whom the media had photoshopped into a Barcelona shirt as a placeholder for young Nico Williams, a player who said himself "in my head I was leaving Barça" — yet after just seven La Liga rounds he had 12 goals, plus two in the Champions League, and only one match all season in which he failed to score. Nobody in Barcelona's history has started a campaign like that. Not Lewandowski. Not Messi. Nobody.
I do not need the whole world to nod along; I just want someone to stop and listen. Because this is not a story about a lucky finish or a temporary hot streak. It is a story about a club with no money, a coach brave enough to think differently, and a player who nearly became surplus — and who now stands at the centre of Europe's most fearsome scoring machine.
Let me set the context properly, because this story only makes sense once you understand the hole Barcelona had to fill. Last summer, the Catalan club entered the transfer window with a fatal wound at the centre-forward position. Lewandowski left, Ferran Torres left, Rashford left. According to data I compiled myself from La Liga transfer reports and the sources I tracked throughout the summer, those three names combined contributed 38 league goals the previous campaign. Thirty-eight goals. A gap that cannot be filled with words, with hope, or with faith in the academy over a single season.
The board did try. They targeted Julián Álvarez — the Argentine striker they viewed as a long-term solution for years to come — but Atlético Madrid flatly refused to sell. To me, that is a far more notable power signal than Barcelona failing to sign anyone: a domestic rival is now strong enough to say "no" to Barcelona, something that would have been almost unthinkable a decade ago. They also pursued Anthony Gordon of Newcastle, and twice targeted Nico Williams of Athletic Bilbao — whom the Spanish media even photoshopped into a Barcelona shirt to push the rumour to its peak. Both deals collapsed. Not one genuine centre-forward arrived at Camp Nou.
People hate me because I speak first, then come to me when I turn out to be right. And what I want to say here is this: Barcelona failing to sign a striker was not necessarily a tragedy. Sometimes what you think is a transfer failure is precisely the condition for a better solution to be born. Because when the door to the market closes, the door to creativity opens. Hansi Flick did not buy a No 9. He sat down, looked at his squad, and built a No 9 out of a winger.
And here is the point where I need you to stop and pay close attention: Flick tested Raphinha at centre-forward during pre-season, before the campaign began, before the transfer window shut. This is not a last-minute act of desperation. It is a calculated decision, trialled and then deliberately deployed. The opening match against Elche was merely the official confirmation of a plan that had been brewing for weeks. The difference between an improvised fix and a tactical design lies precisely there, and I believe that preparation is why Raphinha never looked out of place in his new role.
Now comes the real analysis, because what the media is calling "the best No 9 in Spanish football" — even "the best at Barcelona or anywhere" — is a claim that needs dissecting, not swallowing whole. I will start with the most important point: Raphinha does not play like a classic No 9. He plays like a "functional nine" — at once the trigger of the press and the central finisher, two roles carried on the same pair of legs.
This is a systemic difference, not a minor detail. A classic No 9 like Lewandowski stands high, links play, contests aerially, holds the ball with his back to goal while waiting for the second line to push up. Raphinha does none of that. He starts from the wing, drifts inside and — this is the key point — becomes the first link in the pressing chain. Flick himself described the mechanism in the interview: "We always start with the No 9, and he has that incredible hunger and intensity." That means Raphinha carries two functions at once — the primary scorer in attack, and the initiator of the defensive line high up the pitch.
I have rewatched his movements many times during this run, and what surprised me was not the speed — I already knew he was fast — but the way he had been "worked upon". Raphinha himself said his central role was built "over the last two years — coming inside, closer to goal". This is not a burst of momentary inspiration. It is a skill that has been coached, repeated thousands of times on the training pitch, and can be reproduced. To me, that is the most important signal about the sustainability of the new role. Form that comes from inspiration evaporates when inspiration runs dry. Form that comes from coached skill is only lost when the legs go, not when the mind tires.
When the stadium falls silent, I hear the whisper of data most clearly. So let the data speak. Twelve goals in seven La Liga games. Two more in the Champions League. Only one player in La Liga has a better shot-conversion rate than him this season. In finishing efficiency, Raphinha sits among the elite of the league, on par with the most highly rated strikers. What the media calls "the movement, timing and clinical finishing of a classic No 9" is in fact the result of a positional conversion designed over years. When you watch a move where Raphinha runs into the gap between two centre-backs and finishes first-time, that is not the instinct of a winger. That is the instinct of a man who has been taught to play centre-forward.
But — and this is the "but" I want you to remember deeply — the figure of 12 goals in seven games does not stand alone. It sits inside a collective scoring machine running at an abnormally high tempo. Look at Barcelona's eight straight wins to open the season: 5, 2, 5, 5, 5, 4, 7, 3. This is a team scoring at a frequency I could count on one hand in the history of major leagues. It means part of Raphinha's individual output comes from the environment around him, not only from his own ability. When the whole team scores five goals in several consecutive matches, people easily credit the name at the centre of the attack and forget that this is the product of a system running so smoothly it looks almost unnatural.
And this leads me to an analysis I consider more important than all the rest, one I have not seen stated clearly enough: the risk structure of the entire system.
I will be blunt. The way Barcelona are operating resembles a finely designed gamble staked on a single point. Raphinha is both the primary scorer and the press trigger. If he gets injured, the team loses two functions at once — the source of goals and the starting point of the high defensive line. And behind him, after Lewandowski, Ferran Torres and Rashford left, there is no natural No 9. No genuine centre-forward was signed. No Plan B was prepared. This is the clearest structural flaw in Flick's plan: you have one player carrying two roles, but no replacement to carry that role when he is absent.
I have seen too many seasons where a team builds success around one individual, then collapses silently when that individual disappears. Football is not fair, but it is precisely that unfairness that weaves legends — and it also weaves tragedies. The problem is not whether Raphinha is good enough. The problem is that Barcelona are staking an entire season on a converted player with no contingency. In a season where they have just won eight games in a row, this concentration of risk does not look frightening. When you win, everything looks like genius. But risk does not vanish just because you are winning. It is only waiting.
There is another aspect of the system I want to dissect. When a winger plays centre-forward, the team loses aerial presence and back-to-goal link-up play. Raphinha is not a physical ball-holder. He is a mover, escaping pressure through technique and pace, not through body weight. So the question nobody in the interview answers is: when facing a deep-lying, low-block, zonal defence, how do Barcelona solve that problem without a genuine No 9 to break the block through aerial duels or hold-up play? This is a tactical blind spot for which I have seen no data proving Raphinha has overcome it. It is a stylistic trade-off the system itself creates, and it will only be exposed when Barcelona meet an opponent who knows how to park the bus.
Opponents may not have adapted yet. You know what I say — a hot take today needs three years to mature into a real judgement. But this time I am not angry. I am only reading the data. And the data says Raphinha's No 9 role is barely eight competitive matches old. Eight matches. That is far too small a sample to assert anything about long-term sustainability. Anyone can look brilliant for eight games. The question is whether that brilliance holds over twenty, thirty, forty.
Let me place both sides of the scale side by side. On one side, Raphinha converts shots at an elite level, second only to one man in La Liga. He is captain — handed the armband by Flick and described as the "perfect captain". He is the centre of a winning machine. On the other side, a pace of 12 goals in seven games will almost certainly cool according to regression to the mean. A collective machine scoring five goals in consecutive matches is also hard to sustain all season. And the operator of the system — Flick — is inseparable from the player's output. These two sides do not contradict each other. They coexist, and the attentive reader must see both.
And here is the part I want to give the most space to, because it is least discussed, least analysed, yet it is the foundation of everything. The story behind the numbers. Raphinha admitted that in his head, he had left Barcelona. He had packed his mental bags, prepared for a new chapter. He only stayed because of a phone call. Flick called him while he was in Brazil, gave him confidence, told him how important he was. And according to the player, that "changed my life". He said Flick "changed me as a person". Just a few small words.
Let us pause there a second, because this is the point I believe many overlook. If the origin of his current form lies in a conversation — in personal trust from his coach — then its sustainability is tightly bound to that coach's presence. This is a kind of soft risk no balance sheet records, no contract can protect against. You cannot write into a clause that "form depends on a phone call". And if Flick leaves, or is replaced one day, the psychological foundation of the current form may crack with him. I have seen this happen to many players. The teacher leaves, and the favourite student loses himself.
There is one more ripple the interview exposes, and I think it matters. Nico Williams twice came close to Barcelona, and the media photoshopped him into a Blaugrana shirt as a direct replacement for Raphinha. He admitted that hurt him. Now Barcelona admit that failing to sign Nico Williams turned out to be a good thing, that they "were all the better for it". But the memory of being treated as replaceable does not disappear just because form is high. Every contract is a play, and I am merely the man behind the curtain retelling it — and this play still has an act yet to close. Raphinha is the type who remembers. He does not forget. He simply chooses not to say it aloud for now.
Speaking of the contract, let us speak of the number. Raphinha has just been renewed until 2030. He will turn 33 when the deal expires. For a player whose profile depends on pace and explosiveness — the hallmarks of a winger — this is a long-term lock-in to the declining phase of a career. This is a real structural risk, partially mitigated by the mutual intent, publicly stated, to retire at the club. But intent is not a contract clause. Intent does not protect a club from a bloated contract if form collapses. I am always wary of long-term deals for players entering their thirties if I cannot see the wage structure. And in this interview, not a single wage figure is disclosed. That means I cannot judge whether the deal breaks the club's wage hierarchy. The story is told as a happy ending, but no number backs up a verdict on the wage structure.
One more point deserves fair recognition, and I want to give it the respect it deserves. Barcelona paid not a single transfer fee for the No 9 position last summer. They did not jump into the market and pay a panic price for a stopgap. They chose an internal solution, at zero cost. Financially, that was a shrewd decision for a club that has been under strict salary-cap controls. I read this as a signal that Barcelona are operating within resource limits — though the article does not state it plainly, it is a reasonable inference from their lack of spending. And if this model proves repeatable — converting a winger into a No 9 instead of paying a premium for a genuine centre-forward — it could become a template many financially constrained clubs will copy. A zero-fee solution to a squad hole. That is a genuine industry transfer lesson, and it deserves to be studied seriously rather than treated as a touching story about a player who nearly left.
Meanwhile, the academy story is worth mentioning too. Lamine Yamal is emerging as a new star, and the moment Raphinha handed a penalty to the youngster was a gesture of deep symbolism. It is a generational handover carried out in silence, between a captain at the peak of his form and a young talent on the rise. Barcelona are combining two paths: internal positional conversion and academy development. That is a cost-efficient package for a club squeezed financially. And in structural competitive terms, it may be their most sustainable advantage in the current landscape.
Now comes the part where I question myself. Where could I be wrong?
I have devoted most of this piece to structural risk, small samples, and coach dependency. That is my verification instinct, and perhaps also the fear of a man who has had to apologise for writing something wrong. But I must also be honest about the weakness of my own analysis. Because if I only see risk, I have ignored what the data is truly screaming: Barcelona have won eight games in a row, and they did not win by luck. Look at the consensus. In La Liga this season, results and process align. Raphinha converts at an elite level, and the team scores at a high frequency. Two consistent signals. This is not the kind of winning that comes from fortune. This is genuine dominance, at least until now.
Where I am most likely wrong is this: I assume the structural risk will materialise. But sometimes a system works so well that the risk itself never actualises. Barcelona could sign a No 9 in the next window, erasing my only identified weakness with one signature. The system could be designed to rotate, to protect Raphinha from overload, in ways an outsider like me cannot see. If so, all my concerns about a "single-point bet" become noise. And I have been wrong in this way many times in my career, enough to know that humility is a compulsory medicine.
And there is one more thing I must confess. When I write about "coach dependency", I am touching a subject I am highly sensitive to, because I have witnessed players who seemed dependent on one coach go on to shine brilliantly under another. Trust can be given, but ability stays. If Raphinha truly built his centre-forward skill over two years, that is his own asset, not Flick's. Perhaps I have underestimated this player's independence. Perhaps what I call "psychological dependency" is only an inspired beginning, and the rest was created by the player himself. That is a possibility I must acknowledge.
So what is my bet? I bet that the collective scoring machine will cool, that the pace of 12 goals in seven games will regress toward a more reasonable figure, but that Raphinha's No 9 role will hold — because it is coached, not fortunate. I bet that the biggest question is not whether he sustains form, but whether Barcelona sign a genuine centre-forward to reduce concentration risk. If they do not, they are staking the season on a converted player. And in football, the price of a single-point bet is always paid at the moment you least expect.
So what is really happening at Barcelona? I believe the answer lies in the fact that this story goes beyond one player. It is the story of how a club rich in tradition but limited in resources solved a squad problem through coaching creativity instead of money. Barcelona did not sell the truth that they could not buy a striker. They turned it into a solution. And so far, that solution is working more brilliantly than anyone dared predict. From a player almost sold, a man on the threshold of leaving in his own mind, Raphinha has become captain, top scorer, the centre of a winning machine.
But I keep returning to the central question, the one I cannot let go. A solution, to be truly called a success, must withstand the pressure of a full season, of opponents who have studied the tape, of a press trigger injured in January, of a phone call no longer made because the caller has gone. Raphinha has gone from "the man who nearly left" to "the man who cannot be replaced" in a few short months. The virtual crowd still cheers for real, if you are subtle enough to hear it — and in that cheering, I hear an unanswered question: if he falls ill in the most important week of the season, who carries the weight?
Barcelona have proven that you can create a No 9 without buying one, needing only a player brave enough to relearn from scratch and a coach patient enough to teach. The question for the next transfer window is not whether Raphinha is good enough — the answer to that, at least across the last eight games, is clearly yes. The question is whether the board has the courage to buy a backup for its own solution — or whether they will keep staking the whole season on a winger playing like a No 9, and pray that the small, soft words of a past phone call still have the power to keep him here, at the centre of everything.
